Primary euphoria

Euphoria is the emotional experience of anima, so primary euphoria is what primary anima feels like and the definition simply attaches the experience to the source. The reason it needs a separate entry is that the two kinds of euphoria are indistinguishable from inside. Both feel like euphoria, and only the source differs, which is the whole difficulty the framework is built around. Primary euphoria appears to accompany exercise of the conscious will, that which follows the second law of thermodynamics, whereas secondary euphoria seems to result from exposure to life energy related to gravity and macroscopic objects. Marsh suggests it may prove more apt to call primary anima conscious anima and secondary anima life anima, though she treats that as premature. The diagnostic value is in what follows rather than in the moment. Primary euphoria produces joy where connections are secure, prolongs life and builds conduits. Secondary euphoria produces highs, crashes and cravings, creates no conduits and deepens the deficit, since some sources cause the body to release its own stores. The endoself is defined by the loss of access to this specifically, having blocked or inhibited euphoric conduits and unable to access primary euphoria, and the failure is precise rather than general, since an endoself may have perfectly functioning empathy and an endo-ideal may have perfectly working euphoric conduits.

Neuroscience separates wanting from liking, following Berridge, and distinguishes the anticipatory dopaminergic system from opioid-mediated pleasure, which is a division of similar shape drawn on different grounds. Addiction research documents tolerance and the shift from pleasure to craving that Marsh describes as the signature of secondary sources. Positive psychology distinguishes hedonic from eudaimonic wellbeing. What has no counterpart is the claim that the two experiences are subjectively identical and distinguishable only by source and consequence, since the neuroscientific and psychological accounts both assume the person can in principle tell what kind of state they are in.